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  This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the 
coexistence of unionized and non-unionized manufacturing firms in a two-sector economy. The 
impacts of immigration as well as remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union-
nonunion wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that permanent immigration 
brings positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but enlarges the wage 
gap and causes income redistribution. The effects of temporary immigration diverge depending 
on which sector immigrants are allowed to work in and which good is remitted more heavily. In 
particular, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union-
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Despite of being an integral part of globalization, immigration is viewed negatively in public 
opinion. Often when related issues appear in the media, they are about illegal immigration, or 
some other negative images such as taking jobs away and depressing wages, etc. It seems the 
imperfections in the labor market, such as unionization, also serve to create the negative images. 
For instance, it is alleged that, “mass immigration helps employers and hurts workers, and 
unions flourish when immigration is low and they flounder when immigration is high.” There 
are also cries that the AFL-CIO has abandoned American workers, because the Executive 
Council of the AFL-CIO in February 2000 announced a reversal in its posture on immigration, 
by proclaiming that it now “proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers”(Salt Lake Union 
Tribune, September 3, 2001). While before that, the AFL-CIO had sought to protect wages of 
native-born workers by excluding immigrants. However, by making immigrants more 
vulnerable, such sanctions also helped put pressure on the wages of native-born workers. 
In Japan, due to the aging population and the young generation’s tendency to have fewer 
kids, labor shortage especially in agriculture and heavy manual work is becoming a problem. 
Already small numbers of seasonal foreign workers are being introduced. Sooner or later more 
lenient immigration policies like those in Europe may have to be adopted. 
Despite the importance of labor market imperfections on immigration issues, theoretical 
research has been rare. Recently, Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann (1994) and Fuest and Thum 
(2001) analyze immigration in unionized markets, focusing on skill differences. They 
demonstrate that immigration can be beneficial to the host country due to the complementarity 
of unskilled immigrants to skilled natives. Fuest and Thum (2000) study the welfare effects of 
immigration, and show that immigration is beneficial if the wage elasticity of labor demand in 
the competitive sectors is smaller than in the unionized sectors. 
  1 The present paper is closely related to the above, but adopts a different structure and 
with a different focus. We analyze immigration in a two-sector, host-country economy, by 
allowing immigration to be permanent and temporary, and incorporating the activities of labor 
unions. While permanent immigrants are treated identically as residents in the host country and 
can become union members, temporary immigrants work on contracts and must return to their 
home countries when their contracts expire. As such, they can only work in the contracted firms 
and are ineligible to become members of labor unions, even if the contracted firms have unions. 
Temporary immigrants also remit earnings back to their home countries, which can be done in 
either or both goods.  
Specifically, we consider a host-country economy consisting of two sectors: 
manufacturing and agriculture. While there is perfect competition in agriculture, the 
manufacturing sector is characterized by mixed oligopoly – some firms are unionized while 
others are not, and all firms engage in oligopolistic competition. We investigate the impacts of 
immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union-nonunion wage gap 
and national welfare, and find that an increase in permanent immigration brings positive effects 
on these variables (except the competitive wage), and raises the wage gap. That is, while 
permanent immigration increases the welfare of the whole nation, it also causes income 
redistribution, benefiting relatively the labor unions and landowners, and hurting those 
receiving the competitive wage. Similar effects are obtained if temporary immigrants can only 
work in agriculture. 
In contrast, if temporary immigrants can only work in manufacturing, then an increase 
in immigration reduces the competitive wage, the union wage and employment. The union 
utility falls and the union-nonunion wage gap narrows. Workers become more equally paid but 
poorer, while firms and landowners become better off. It is perhaps these consequences and the 
  2 income redistribution effect of immigration, which cause the media to paint a negative picture 
of immigration. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that an increase in permanent immigration raises 
union utility, because the positive employment effect dominates possible negative wage effects. 
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, labor unions may gain from immigration. These 
findings seem to be consistent with the experiences in North America, Australia and Europe, 
which have recognized the positive effects of immigration on national welfare also and adopted 
constructive immigration policies. 
There is voluminous literature on the impacts of immigration on the host and source 
countries. In the absence of labor unions, for instance, Either (1985) models immigration and 
trade; Brecher and Choudhri (1987) investigate the relation between migration and foreign 
investment; Djajic (1986) and McCormick and Wahba (2000) incorporate the effects of 
remittance on the source country, while Kondoh (1999) analyzes those on the host country; and 
Chao and Yu (2002) study the skill difference of migrants under imperfect competition. For 
studies related to illegal immigration, see Bond and Chen (1987), Djajic (1987), Either (1986), 
and Tawada and Hiraiwa (2003). 
In our model, the unionized sector is assumed to be oligopolistic so that there are 
positive rents to be split between labor and management. We differentiate between temporary 
and permanent immigration, and analyze the effects of remittance. The coexistence of 
unionized and non-unionized firms in manufacturing and the distinction between temporary and 
permanent immigration present several interesting possibilities that are closer to real world 
scenarios. Another novelty of the present paper is that both goods can be remitted at the same 
time under temporary immigration. In the literature, remittance is conducted in only one good, 
while the other good is assumed to be non-tradable (see for instance, Kondoh, 1999). The 
  3 present setup allows us to obtain results that are more detailed and complement those in the 
literature, which hopefully can help to shed light on future immigration policies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 
3 investigates permanent immigration. Section 4 studies temporary immigration in agriculture. 
Section 5 looks into the case of temporary immigration in manufacturing. And section 6 
compares all the cases and provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Basic Model Setup 
2.1 Consumers 
Consider a host-country economy consisting of two sectors: Manufacturing (x) and 
Agriculture (y), with y as the numeraire good. While perfect competition prevails in agriculture, 
manufacturing is characterized by Cournot-Nash competition of a fixed number of n firms. We 
assume that a typical consumer maximizes the following homothetic utility function, 






where   and C  are respectively the domestic consumption of goods x and y, and α  is a 
positive constant. Utility maximization subject to the standard budget constraint yields the 















  We assume that the host country is import competing in manufacturing, that is, it 
imports good x and exports good y. The host country is small and takes world price as given. 
However, it imposes a quota, q, on foreign imports. The choice of a quota instead of a tariff is 
  4 based on the simplifying assumption that labor is the only factor of production in 
manufacturing and that this sector is imperfectly competitive. As is well known that under a 
non-prohibitive tariff, the market power of the domestic firm disappears and there is no rents 
left for the union to bargain over with management. Another justification for this assumption 
might be that under the WTO system, while tariffs are on the decrease, non-tariff barriers still 
exist in various forms, which limit the volume of trade. 
To maintain balanced trade, the following must be satisfied 
  , (3) 
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where x and y denote the total outputs of respectively manufacturing and agriculture produced 




In agriculture, the production of good y uses labor and land.  
  , (4)  (, ) y yy L T =
where y is output, Ly and T are inputs of labor and land respectively. Perfect competition 
prevails in this sector. The profit function of a typical perfectly competitive firm is:  
  . (5)  0
y
y yw L r T π=− −
where w0 is the competitive wage paid to workers in agriculture, and   is the rental to land. 
Labor is hired until the following condition is satisfied: 
r
  . (6)  01 (, y wy L T =
  5  
2.3 Manufacturing 
This sector is characterized by mixed oligopoly. There are n oligopolistically 
competitive firms, m of which are unionized, and the rest, n-m, are non-unionized. The number 
of each type of firms is exogenous. In a typical unionized firm, employment and wages are 
determined by negotiation. All firms behave as Cournot-Nash oligopolists and take the actions 
of their competitors as given. 
The production of good x uses labor only. The production function of a typical 
manufacturing firm i is: 











A typical non-unionized firm maximizes profits and pays its workers the reservation 
wage,  . Its profit function can be written as  0 w
  . (8)  0 ()
j pwL π= −
where the superscript j indexes non-unionized firm j. All n-m non-unionized firms maximize 
profits in a Cournot fashion, which results in the following first order conditions: 
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In contrast, the profit function of a typical unionized firm k is: 
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where   is the wage paid to union members in firm k, and   is the union employment. In a 
unionized firm, all domestic workers join in the union. In other words, the unionized firm does 
not hire non-unionized domestic workers. For instance, most unionized firms in Japan only hire 




A typical union k, has a Stone-Geary type utility function (see Calvo, 1978, and 
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991): 
  . (11)  0 (,)( )
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Thus, the union is interested in employment as well as a union wage premium above the 
competitive wage. 
The wages and employment in unionized firms are determined through negotiations. 
The solution concept we adopt is Nash bargaining. The union and the firm jointly maximize the 
following Nash product, choosing employment and wages: 
  . (12)  (, )
kk k
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The equilibrium satisfies the following first order conditions: 
  , (13a)  1 2( ) 0
kk
u pw L p −+ =
  , (13b)  0 2
k pww −+ =













. In equilibrium, we seek a symmetric solution. That is, we assume all 
the non-unionized firms are identical, and the same applies to all the unionized firms. Thus, 
each non-unionized firm in manufacturing employs   of labor and pays the competitive 








And finally, there is full employment and full mobility of labor among non-unionized 
firms between the two sectors: 










Combining conditions (9), (13a) and (13b), we obtain 
  , (15)  0 u LL =
which says that in equilibrium, a unionized firm and a non-unionized firm employs identical 
number of workers. This arises because the union utility function in (11) implies that the union 
is not biased toward either employment or wage premium. Hence unionization does not cause 
employment distortion in this model (see the neutral union case in Zhao, 2001). The firm and 
the union negotiate to maximize the profits by choosing employment first, and then divide the 
realized profits by choosing a wage jointly, as shown in (13a) and (13b). 
  8   Equations (6), (9), (13a), (13b) and (14) determine the five endogenous variables of the 
model,  ,  ,  , w and  . This completes the setup of the basic model. In the next sections, 
we shall conduct comparative statics studies on  ,  ,  , and  .  
y L 0 L u L 0 w
y L u L w 0 w
 
3. Permanent  Immigration 
We first investigate the case of permanent immigration, under which immigrants are treated 
identically with home workers in the host country. Immigrants can work in both sectors, and 
can become union members if they work in manufacturing. Let   denote the total number of 
immigrants. Under permanent immigration, using (15), condition (14) becomes 
M L
  . (14’)  yx LLL L += + M
where  .  0 () xu u Ln Lm L n m L ==+ −
By total differentiation, we derive the following comparative statics results (see Appendix 1 




















ambiguous, the union wage premium over the competitive wage increases, i.e.,  
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Thus, we can establish 
 
  9 Proposition 1: Under permanent immigration, an increase in immigration raises employment 
in both sectors and the union wage gap over the competitive wage, but reduces the competitive 
wage. 
 
  The effects of immigration on the competitive wage and employment in each sector are 
as expected. In general, it is unclear if immigration raises or reduces the union wage, because 
the union wage is affected in three ways. The first is that an increase in permanent immigration 
causes a reduction in the marginal product of labor in agriculture. In turn the competitive wage 
decreases, putting downward pressure on the union wage; The second comes from the increase 
in manufacturing output, reducing the relative price; The third is that the output of agriculture 
increases, raising the relative price. However, as shown in (a5) in appendix 1, if  , i.e., if 
the marginal product of agricultural labor   does not fall too fast, then an increase in 
immigration raises the union wage. This could arise, for instance, in countries richly endowed 
with land such as Australia, Canada and the US. In any case, even if the union wage decreases, 
the decrease in the competitive wage outweighs it, leading to a widening of the union-nonunion 
wage gap. Thus, permanent immigration causes income redistribution, relatively benefiting the 
union members while hurting those earning the competitive wage. As a consequence, 
landowners also gain. 
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  10 Condition (17) follows naturally from proposition 1, stating that a rise in permanent 
immigration leads to increases in union employment and the union wage premium over the 
competitive wage, resulting in higher utility for the union. 
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  To investigate the impact of immigration on national welfare, let us define the indirect 
utility function as 
  , (19)  (,) vv p I ≡
where   is national income. From (2) and (3), total differentiation of (19) yields 
, using which we derive: 
Ip x =+
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Summarizing the above, we establish 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in permanent immigration raises the utility of the union, the profits 
of the manufacturing firms and national welfare. 
  11  
  Under labor market imperfections such as unionization in some manufacturing firms, 
permanent immigration unambiguously benefits the host country. Even though the competitive 
wage decreases, the combined effect of increased output and employment more than offsets the 
loss in wages. As a result, union utility, firm profits and national welfare all increase. Only 
those earning the competitive wage lose. The experiences in America, Australia and Europe 
seem to have provided justification to this result. 
 
4.  Temporary Immigration into Agriculture 
In this case, foreign workers sign short-term contracts to work in agriculture only. And 
upon completion of their contracts, they must return to their home countries. They are ineligible 
to become members of labor unions in the host country because they are on short-term contracts 
and work in agriculture only. An example is that farms in the U.S. employ temporary Mexican 
workers during busy seasons. 
Because temporary immigrants return to their home countries after the contract is 
finished, their income is excluded from the national income of the host country; that is, under 
temporary immigration in agriculture, the national income of the host country becomes 
  . (21)  0 yu I npL y w L =+ − M
4.1  Remittance 
  Under temporary immigration, an immigrant worker sends a fraction of the earnings 
back to the source (home) country, and consumes the other fraction in the host country. 
Remittance can be done in either good x or good y, or a combination of them. Suppose each 
  12 immigrant worker sends back home respectively θ  units of good x and γ  units of good y. Since 
good y is the numeraire, wages are expressed in units of good y, which implies 
  , (22)  0 pw θγ +≤ ≤ p
i.e., the worker cannot remit more than the net earnings, and the competitive wage cannot 
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where Yy ,  and  . The terms θ  and γ  indicate 
respectively the total amounts of good x and good y the temporary workers remit. 
* () yM L p q L γ =− − M Xx q L θ =+− M L M L























) . (24c) 
Condition (24a) says that an increase in the amount of good x remitted raises the relative price 
of good x, while condition (24b) states that an increase in the amount of good y remitted 
reduces the relative price of good x. And condition (24c) implies that if the ratio of remittance 
to net consumption in the host country is higher (lower) for good x than for good y, then an 
  13 increase in immigration raises (reduces) the relative price of good x. In the extreme case when 
only good x is remitted, an increase in immigration always raises the relative price. The 
opposite arises if only good y is remitted. 
Under temporary immigration into agriculture, labor-management bargaining in 
manufacturing is affected not directly, but only indirectly through adjustments in the labor 
market, i.e., the full employment condition (14’), and the competitive wage in (6). It follows 
that under temporary immigration into agriculture, the endogenous variables  ,   w, and   
are determined by equations (6), (13a), (13b) and (14’), with the inverse demand function given 
by (23). 
y L u L 0 w
The detailed comparative statics calculations of the effects of immigration and 
remittance are reported in Appendix 2, from which we can establish: 
 
Proposition 3:  Under temporary immigration in agriculture, (i) an increase in immigration 
reduces the competitive wage, but raises the intersectoral wage gap if remittances are done in 
the same ratio in both goods. It also raises the union employment and total employment in both 
sectors. National welfare increases if immigration does not cause large changes to domestic 
prices; (ii) an increase in manufacturing remittance raises wages in both sectors, the utility of 
the union and employment in manufacturing, but reduces employment in agriculture; (iii) an 
increase in agricultural remittance has completely opposite effects to (ii); (iv) an increase in 
the remittance of either good reduces national welfare. 
 
  Now we provide some intuition for proposition 3. Part (i) is similar to permanent 
immigration. When temporary immigrants can only work in agriculture, domestic workers will 
  14 migrate to manufacturing to clear the labor market (see Filer, 1992, for empirical evidence). 
And if remittance does not distort domestic prices by too much, then the effects are close to 
permanent immigration, under which national welfare rises. 
In part (ii), an increase in remittance across borders causes several distortions. For 
instance, production of the remitted good must increase, which implies that available resources 
devoted to the production of the other good must fall. When manufacturing remittance goes us, 
this sector gains in terms of wages and employment, while the output of agriculture falls and 
the competitive wage rises. As a consequence, landowners also lose. In part (iii), if agriculture 
remittance increases, then the opposite to part (ii) arises. And finally, part (iv) says that as 
remittance increases, national income falls, which reduces national welfare. 
The implications of proposition 3 are: (i). If there are sufficient adjustments in the labor 
market, then both permanent and temporary immigration in agriculture causes identical effects 
on employment, wages and the intersectoral wage gap. (ii). Remittance of temporary 
immigrants could distort domestic prices and wages, which gives rise to further changes in the 
incomes of factor (land) owners. 
 
5.   Temporary Immigration into Manufacturing and Remittance 
In this case, foreign workers sign short-term contracts to work in manufacturing only. Being 
on short-term contracts, they cannot become members of labor unions in the host country. And 
upon completion of the short-term contracts, they must return to their home countries. An 
example is that Chinese workers were hired for construction in Nagano, Japan, before the 
Nagano Winter Olympics in 1998. Zimmermann (1995) shows that in Europe, guest workers 
are more likely to work in construction and manufacturing. Again, temporary immigrant 
workers remit a portion of their wage earnings back to their home countries. 
  15 Let the number of temporary, contractual foreign workers in a typical firm be  . Because 
there are n firms in manufacturing, the total number of immigrants is  , and the 
employment conditions in (14’) becomes 
m L
M Ln L = m
m   . (25)  yx LLL n L += +
Accordingly, a typical unionized firm hires   of union members and   of immigrant 
workers. And with remittance considered, the inverse demand function becomes 
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where   and nL indicate respectively the total amounts of good x and good y the 
temporary workers remit back to their home countries. 
m nL θ m γ
We continue to assume that the unionized firm does not hire non-unionized domestic 
workers. However, it hires temporary immigrant workers on short-term contracts, who return to 
their home countries when the contracts are finished.
1 The union members receive the union 
wage  , while the immigrant workers receive the competitive wage  . It follows that the 
profit function of a typical unionized firm becomes 
w 0 w
  . (27)  0 (,)( ) ( ) uu Lw pw L pwL π= − + − %
When a unionized firm also hires temporary immigrant workers, then the payoff at the 
threat point changes for the firm, but not for the union. If bargaining breaks down, the union 
 
1  Here the crucial difference is that immigrants are guest workers, whom the firm can refuse to rehire, whereas 
domestic workers cannot subject to such `discrimination’. Thus the firm rather chooses to hire `foreigners’. 
  16 still obtains zero employment and zero wages, but the firm now employs immigrant workers on 
short-term contracts. In this case, the firm’s profit (threat-point payoff) becomes 
  , (28)  00 0 0 (,)( ) m Lw p wL π= − % m
) p
0
where   is the price if bargaining breaks down, i.e., if only immigrant workers are 
hired in the unionized firms.   can be obtained by substituting   into (26). Because 
temporary immigrants are on short-term contracts, the firm does not re-choose the number of 
immigrant workers to hire if bargaining with the union breaks down; that is, the firm employs 
the same number of temporary immigrant workers regardless bargaining breaks down or not. 
However, the price of good x rises to   because output is lower at the threat point. Thus, π  
can be treated as a constant from now on. 
0  ( p >
0 p 0 u L =
0 p 0 %
As such, the Nash product in (12) can be rewritten as 
  , (29)  0 (,)( ) u GL w u ππ =− % %%
where π  is the firm’s net gain from the bargaining game.  0 π − %%
Maximizing (29) with respect to   and w gives rise to the following first order 
conditions: 
u L
  , (30a)  10 2( ) ( ) ( ) / 0 um m u pw L Lp ppL L −+ + +− =
  . (30b)  00 (2 ) ( ) / mu pw w p p L L −+ +− =
If temporary immigrants work only in manufacturing, in which some firms are 
unionized, then interesting consequences arise. To see this, we compare conditions (30a) and 
  17 (30b) with (13a) and (13b). The former two equations contain extra terms, which are negative. 
This implies, union wages and employment both are driven down by temporary immigrant 
employment in manufacturing. This arises because firms hire a positive number of immigrant 
workers even if bargaining with the unions break down, which improves the threat-point payoff 
of the firms and puts them in a stronger bargaining position. 
Under temporary immigration in manufacturing, the national income of the host country 
becomes 
  . (31)  0 () xu m IL L n p y w n L =+ + − m
And the corresponding national welfare can be obtained by substituting (31) into (19). 
It follows that under temporary migration into manufacturing, the endogenous variables 
,  , w, and   are determined by equations (6), (30a), (30b) and (25), with the inverse 
demand function given by (26). The detailed comparative statics calculus is reported in 
Appendix 3, from which we can establish: 
y L u L 0 w
 
Proposition 4:  Under temporary immigration in manufacturing only, (i) an increase in 
immigration raises employment in agriculture but reduces the competitive wage. It also reduces 
the union wage and employment, and the union-nonunion wage gap. National welfare increases 
if the unionized firm employs more temporary immigrants than union workers; (ii) an increase 
in manufacturing remittance raises union employment and the competitive wage, but reduces 
employment in agriculture; (iii) an increase in agricultural remittance raises agricultural 
employment but reduces union employment and the competitive wage; (iv) an increase in 
  18 remittance could either reduce or raise national welfare, depending on which good is remitted 
and whether the unionized firm employs more temporary immigrants than union workers. 
 
  The intuition for proposition 4 is in order. Part (i) says that when temporary immigrants 
can only work in manufacturing, domestic workers will migrate to agriculture to clear the labor 
market, which leads to decreases in the competitive wage and increases in agricultural output. 
Immigration also puts downward pressure on the union wage and employment, narrowing the 
union-nonunion wage gap. This arises in two channels. One is the fall of the competitive wage, 
and the other is the improvement of the unionized firm’s threat-point payoff, which leaves the 
union in a weaker bargaining position. The former is dominated by the latter. 
In part (ii), when there is an increase in manufacturing remittance, employment in this 
sector rises, while the output of agriculture falls and the competitive wage rises. As a 
consequence, landowners also lose. In part (iii), if agriculture remittance increases, then the 
opposite to part (ii) arises. And finally, part (iv) includes several cases. Suppose the 
manufacturing good is remitted. As remittance increases, national income falls (rises) if the 
unionized firm employs more (less) temporary immigrants than union workers, which reduces 
(raises) national welfare. The opposite arises if the agriculture good is remitted. 
Similar to proposition 3, proposition 4 also implies that the remittance of temporary 
immigrants could distort domestic prices and wages, leading to further changes in the incomes 
of factor (land) owners. More importantly, temporary immigration in manufacturing reduces 
not only all wages, but also the union-nonunion wage gap. That is, workers become more 
equally paid, but poorer. Nonetheless, national welfare increases if the unionized firm employs 
more temporary immigrants than union workers, in which case the increase in output and 
profits offsets the fall in wages. 
  19  
6. Concluding  Remarks 
We have investigated cases of permanent and temporary immigration, with some firms 
unionized and others non-unionized in manufacturing. Under temporary immigration, 
immigrants sign short-term contracts to work in either agriculture or manufacturing. They also 
remit a fraction of their income home. The different effects of immigration and remittance are 
summarized in Table 1. As detailed in the appendices, circled signs are obtained conditionally. 
We hope these results could help to explain the experience in North America, Australia and 
Europe,
2 to shed light on the negative images of immigration in the media, and most 
importantly to provide some guidance to immigration policy in other host countries. 
From Table 1, the following conclusions can be drawn. (i) Permanent immigration 
increases outputs in both sectors, the utility of the union and national welfare, but decrease the 
competitive wage. It also increases the union-nonunion wage gap and causes income 
redistribution. (ii) Under temporary immigration, consequences are very different depending on 
which sector immigrants are allowed to work in. If they can only work in agriculture, then 
employment in both sectors increase and the union-nonunion wage gap may also increase, but 
the competitive wage decreases; if they can only work in manufacturing, then agricultural 
employment increases while union employment decreases. The union-nonunion wage gap 
narrows, because while the competitive wage falls, the union wage falls even harder. 
Furthermore, the utility of the union also decreases. (iii) Regardless of which good is remitted, 
an increase in remittance raises output (employment) in the remitted good and reduces that in 
                                                 
2  Two recent books present contrasting current immigration conditions in Europe and the U.S. (see Borjas, 1999; 
Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 2002). 
  20 the other good. (iv) National welfare increases under permanent immigration, and under 
temporary immigration conditionally.  
Often the wage is higher in the host country than in the source country, sometimes 
substantially higher. When introducing temporary immigration, the host country government 
could adopt some policy to tax the earnings of immigrants. Adequate policies increase the 
earnings of the immigrants as well as the welfare of the host country, and help to create positive 
images of immigration in the media. 
  It is argued that in countries with stricter immigration rules, immigrants are `segregated’ 
to the service sector, such as restaurants, ethnic grocery, babysitting, etc., in which the services 
of immigrants are usually non-traded. The present model can be extended to cover such a non-
traded goods sector. For instance, suppose sector X produces non-tradable services instead of 
manufacturing, then the import quota q becomes zero. Because non-tradable goods cannot be 
remitted, the parameter θ  also becomes zero. These can be readily incorporated and become a 
special case in our model. One can immediately see that remittance (done only in the other 
good) will change domestic prices, which will have additional impacts on other variables. 
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  21 Appendix 1 
  This appendix deals with the case of permanent migration. Totally differentiating (13a), 
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which is positive provided  . A sufficient condition for this is:  , 
which is satisfied by the assumption that the host country is a net importer of good x. 
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  22 Appendix 2 
  This appendix deals with the case of temporary immigration in agriculture only. Totally 
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which is positive provided  . A sufficient condition for this is:  , 
which is satisfied by the assumption that the host country is a net importer of good x. 
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,  given in (23c). Condition (a25) is 








. This arises if remittances of both goods are done in the same ratio. 
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Condition (a26) is positively signed if an increase in immigration does not change the domestic 
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  This appendix deals with the case of temporary immigration in manufacturing only. 
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The determinant of the matrix above is 
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<− . As stated in 
Appendix 2, the first condition is satisfied by the assumption that the host country is a net 
importer of good x. And the second condition is satisfied if land endowment T is sufficiently 
small, such as in Japan. 
Straightforward calculations yield: 
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, we can derive 
, which is negative if   and positive otherwise. It 
follows that the sign of (a32) can be determined to be negative if  , and positive 




  28 otherwise. In words, if the unionized firm employs more (less) temporary immigrants than 
unionized workers, then an increase in remittance of the manufacturing good reduces (raises) 
national welfare. 
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The sign of (a37) is positive if  , and negative otherwise. In words, if the 
unionized firm employs more (less) temporary immigrants than unionized workers, then an 
increase in remittance of the agricultural good raises (reduces) national welfare. 
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<− , i.e., if the land endowment T is sufficiently 
small, such as in Japan, then condition (a42) is negatively signed, implying that immigration 
reduces the intersectoral wage gap if temporary immigrants can only work in manufacturing. 
Furthermore, given the negative signs of (a39) and (a42), condition (a41) must also be 
negatively signed, i.e., an increase in temporary immigration in manufacturing reduces the 
union wage. And because (a38) states that immigration reduces union employment, it follows 
that the union utility must decrease. 
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<− ,  we find that if  , the sign of (a43) becomes 
positive. That is, if the unionized firm employs more temporary immigrants than unionized 
workers, then an increase in immigration raises national welfare. 
m LL ≥ u
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(i, j): Temporary immigration in sector i and increase in remittance of good j. 
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